We investigate the bimodal logics sound and complete under the interpretation of modal operators as the provability predicates in certain natural pairs of arithmetical theories (F', ?2). Carlson characterized the provability logic for essentially reflexive extensions of theories, i.e. for pairs similar to (PA, ZF). Here we study pairs of theories (F', %!) such that the gap between F and Q is not so wide. In view of some general results concerning the problem of classification of the bimodal provability logics we are particularly interested in such pairs (F, 42) that % is axiomatized over T by L',-sentences only, and, for each n > 1, Q proves the n-times iterated consistency of LT. A complete axiomatization, along with the appropriate Kripke semantics and decision procedures, is found for the two principal cases: finitely axiomatizable extensions of this sort, like e.g. (Z,Y,) ), etc., and reflexive extensions, like (PRA, PRA + {Con(lC,) 1 n 2 l}), etc. We show that the first logic, ICP, is the minimal and the second one, RP, is the maximal within the class of the provability logics for such pairs of theories. We also show that there are some provability logics lying strictly between these two. As an application of the results of this paper, in the last section the polymodal provability logics for natural recursive progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency are characterized. We construct a system of ordinal notation 2, which gives exactly one notation to each constructive ordinal, such that the logic corresponding to any progression along %" coincides with that along natural Kalmar elementary well-orderings.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the bimodal provability logics for pairs of recursively enumerable theories containing a sufficiently strong fragment of arithmetic, for which we take the Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic EA.
According to the usual arithmetical interpretation of the propositional bimodal language 9(0, A) the modal operators q and A are interpreted as the provability predicates Pr, and Pr, in given theories Y and f%. The provability logic for (Y, %!), denoted PRL(F, a), is the collection of all bimodal formulas universally provable in Y n % under the interpretation w.r.t. Y and 49.
Informally speaking, PRL(F, %) specifies the amount of information on provability that the two theories Y and % know about each other. Thus, the bimodal provability logics can be viewed as specific "logics of knowledge", the informal notion of "knowledge" being identified in this situation with the formal concept of provability. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the question what the bimodal provability logics may look like in general and, in particular, to characterize PRL(F, @) for some natural pairs of theories (5, %).
At present very little is known in answer to either part of this question. So far, all the results of general character in this area come from the theory of the unimodal provability logics. First of all, from the results of Solovay [18] we know that, at least for sound theories Y and %,' the fragment of PRL(Y, 4%) in the language 9(o) of q alone, as well as the one in the language of A, coincides with the set of theorems of the unimodal provability logic GL of Giidel and Lob. This means, in particular, that such fragments do not actually depend on the choice of Y and 4? and therefore are not too informative.
Secondly, we know that every bimodal provability logic has to be a normal extension of the system CS obtained by combining the axioms and rules of GL, formulated separately in Y(o) and Z'(A), with the obvious mixed principles:
Smorynski [17, p. 2031 , using the uniform version of Solovay's Completeness Theorem, showed that CS is the minimal bimodal provability logic, i.e. there exists a pair (Y-, %) of finite extensions of PA such that PRL(Y, 92) = CS. 2 Deeper information on PRL(.T, 42) can be obtained from the so-called Classification Theorem for unimodal logics of provability [3] . The (unimodal) provability logic of a theory F at a theory %', denoted PRL*(Y), is defined as the collection of all formulas of Z(o) provable in q under every arithmetical interpretation w.r.t. Y.
Thus, PRL"(F)
contains exactly those provability principles for Y which can be verified by means of %, and coincides with the set of all 5?(o) formulas 4 such that
AC$ E PRL(T, 42).
There exists a continuum of logics of the form PRL*(.F) [l] , and the Classification Theorem gives a complete and explicit characterization of such logics within the lattice of extensions of GL.3 t That is, for theories whose theorems hold in the standard model of arithmetic.
For simplicity, in the following discussion we shall speak about sound theories only. ' C. Smorynski proved this statement in a slightly more general setup. Our system CS is, in fact, a bimodal fragment of his three modal logic PRL,, with the third modal operator corresponding to Peano Arithmetic itself. 3 This theorem is the outcome of the work of several authors (see [2, 20, 7, 3] ).
The final results, showing the completeness of the existing classification of the unimodal provability logics, were obtained in the paper [S] , where the reader can also find an almost self-contained exposition of all necessary background results.
Roughly, the Classification Theorem states that PRL'(Y) essentially depends only on the relative strength of the theories Y and !f3 measured in terms of the reflection principles for Y provable within a. For example, if & is strong enough, then P&X* (9) coincides with one of the following three decidable logics:
l S = GL{@ + d}, found by Solovay [IS];
l D = GL{l 01, q (oqb v q $) + 04 v q t+b}, found by Dzhaparidze [7] ; l A = GL{l o"l 1 n 3 l}, found by Artemov [2] ."
Here the expression GL{ ... } denotes the logic axiomatized over the set of all theorems of GL by the schemes listed within braces and with modus ponens as the sole rule of inference. It is easily seen that PRL" (F) contains and thus coincides with S iff 4? proves the Local Reflection Principle for F:
{Pr, rQ1 + Q 1 Q a sentence}.
(1.1)
PRL*(F)
z D iff % proves the Local Z-Reflection Principle for 9, i.e., scheme (1.1) restricted to CF-sentences Q. PRL"(F) 2 A iff, for all natural numbers n > 1, e k cony9-),
where Con'(F):= Con(Y), Con"+'(Y):=
Con(F + Con"(F)),
and Con(Y) denotes the formula expressing the consistency of Y. We shall call a theory @ satisfying this property injinitely confident in F.
Thus, if 4Y is infinitely confident in Y-, PRL*(F) has to be either S, or D, or A. If the gap between 9 and & is not so wide, the picture of the unimodal provability logics becomes somewhat more complicated, but the essential feature remains: only a few of the modal logics extending GL may have the form PRL"(F).
For bimodal logics this obviously entails that not all (normal) extensions of CS may have the form
PRL(S, %). Moreover, we can naturally associate with every bimodal logic E its type (a)' := (4 E y(O) 1 GI t-A#},
and an easy analysis shows that ( .)" surjectively maps normal extensions of CS onto the lattice of the unimodal logics extending GL. The Classification Theorem not only shows that not every type is materialized as that of a bimodal provability logic, but also gives a complete description of all such possible types. In view of these results a natural question arises: is there only one bimodal provability logic for each type? And, if no, what is the structure of the provability logics of a given type?
A well-known theorem due to Carlson [6] , which in fact was the only explicit characterization of the bimodal provability logic for a natural pair of theories, implies that there is only one bimodal provability logic of S-type. It corresponds precisely to essentially reflexive extensions of theories, such as (PA, ZF), and is actually a maximal among the bimodal provability logics (for pairs of sound theories). Carlson's logic is axiomatized over CS by the obvious principle:
In this paper we study the bimodal provability logics of A-type. We shall find that, in comparison with the degenerate case of S-type logics, some new, specifically bimodal phenomena come into play here, which show, in particular, that the answer to the first of the two questions above its negative. In fact, the structure of A-type bimodal provability logics is quite rich. We shall not give a complete answer to the second question, but we shall exhibit some nice properties of this structure, demonstrating that this line of research is not completely fruitless.
There is a fairly representative class of pairs of theories having A-type provability logics. These are infinitely confident III-axiomatized extensions of theories (Y-, %). The infinite confidency provides the necessary lower bound for PRL* (S) , and the ZZ,-axiomatizability of (9, %), which means that %! is obtained from Y by adding arithmetical n,-axioms only, is a natural sufficient condition for Clearly, for all c(, p, if p + w < a then the theory FE is an infinitely confident and L',-axiomatized extension of FP. Moreover, F# is finitely axiomatizable over FP for a a successor, and reflexive over YP for a a limit ordinal.
In the last section of this paper we introduce a system of ordinal notation %" which gives exactly one notation to each constructive ordinal, so as to satisfy this property provably for all the notations from ZZ'. Thereby, the provability logic with infinitely many modal operators (a modal operator for each constructive ordinal) for any progression of this type along d will be the same as that along any natural Kalmar elementary well-ordering.
This corollary generalizes some earlier results of the author in [4] . Modulo the results of the previous sections of this paper it is a pure recursion theoretic result. It is of some independent interest, because it answers a question of Rose [14, p. 551 about the classes of ordinals for which there are primitively recursively built-up systems of ordinal notation. As a side remark we shall note that our system %" satisfies this property; therefore such systems exist up to the first nonrecursive ordinal.
Preliminaries

Theories
All theories in this paper are assumed to be first order and formulated in a language containing symbols for all the (schemes of) Kalmar elementary functions.' The Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic EA is a theory whose principal axioms are: (1) defining equations for each Kalmar elementary function; (2) the scheme of induction for quantifier free formulas.
Elementary formulas in the language of EA are those containing no unrestricted quantifiers. It is known that each elementary formula is equivalent in EA to one of the formf(x,, . . . ,x,) = 0, for a suitable functional symbol 1:
C1-formulas (If,-formulas)
are those of the form 3x1 3x2 . . . 3x, A (resp. VXl vxz . . . Vx, A), with A elementary.
We write XEC, for the natural elementary formula expressing the predicate "x is (the Gbdel number (g.n.) of) a ,X,-sentence", and 5 One can as well stipulate that all theories are formulated in the language of PA and contain at least the theory Ido + EXP (which is exactly the fragment of EA in the language of PA (cf.
[23])).
similarly for n, . x E St denotes the elementary predicate "x is the g.n. of a sentence in the language of EA".
We assume further that each theory F comes equipped with an elementary formula AxF(x) representing the set of (Godel numbers of) mathematical axioms of F-, from which an elementary formula Pr&(y, X) expressing the predicate "y is (the g.n. of) a proof of the formula (with the g.n.) x" is constructed in a standard way (cf. Two theories % and V are equivalent iff 4 and V (extensionally) have the same set of theorems. In this case we also write % z Y (4% = -Y-means that Ax* and Ax, are graphically the same formulas). 4 and V are called provably equivalent iff EA t Vx(Pr,(x) c) Pry(x)).
All theories in this paper are sound, i.e. the arithmetical consequences of them hold in the standard model N of arithmetic.
We will also often refer to the following three folklore facts about EA: EA /-Vx F(x,f(x)).
Extensions
An extension is a pair (F, %!) of theories such that EA I-Vx (Ax,(x) + Ax&x)).
We assume that all theories extend EA in this way. Clearly for any extension (~7, %) we also have An extension (F-, 92) is II,-axiomatized iff every axiom of 42 which is not an axiom of F is a Li',-sentence. (F-, $2) is a provably fl,-axiomatized extension iff this fact is provable in EA, i.e.
EA k Vx(Ax,(x) + A,(x) v x E II,).
In this case we also say that the theory 92 is provably III-axiomatized over Y-. Also note that each finite and L',-axiomatized extension is provably ZZ,-axiomatized. Our next goal is to show that the provability predicate for provably U,-axiomatized extensions of a given theory can be represented in a specific technically convenient form. To this end first we need the following lemma. Proof. Any proof y of a formula x in S! can be transformed into that in the theory Y by inserting proofs of all necessary %-axioms at the beginning of y. This argument is formalizable in EA (as an easy induction on the length of y) once we can prove that the length of the resulting derivation is bounded by an elementary function in (the length of) y. By the Witnessing theorem one can find a function symbol f such that EA I-Vx(Ax,(x) -+ Prfv(f(x), x))), from which the required bound is easily constructed. 0
Note that Lemma 2.2 holds for parametric families of theories as well. In a similar manner we obtain the following lemma. As Tr(x) is a II,-formula and Ax,,~(x) is elementary, U(m) is (equivalent to) a n,-formula as well. 
fb#') = Prg rf(4)1 .
The provability logic for (Y-, &) is then defined as follows:
PRL(5, a):= {~E~(o,
A) 1 vfs t-f@)}.
The system CSM is given by the following rules and axiom schemes: CSM together with the scheme (P) is denoted just P.6 It is not difficult to show that P is actually the minimal among the bimodal provability logics for provably Z7,-axiomatized extensions of theories (cf. ES]).
The system ICP is P together with the scheme
nEN.
Clearly, PRL(T, 42) 2 (IC) iff the theory & is infinitely confident in F.
Provability logics with propositional constants are defined in a similar manner.
Let U(o, c) be the language of GL enriched by a new propositional constant symbol c and let an arithmetic sentence A and a theory F be given. An A-interpretation w.r.t. F is a mapping f of Y(n, c)-formulas to arithmetic sentences which commutes with boolean connectives and translates q as provability in 9 and c as the sentence A:
is the set of all _Y(o, c)-formulas provable in F under every A-interpretation:
The canonical translation * of Y(o, A) into 3'(0, c) is defined inductively as follows:
(1) p* = p for every propositional letter p, I* = I;
(2) ($ + ICI)* = (4* -+ II/*); (3) (@)* = a(+*), (Add* = dc + 6*).
By Lemma 2.1 we immediately obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. For any arithmetic sentence A, if% = T + A then PRL(.T, a) = {$J E .Y(o, A) 1 PRL,[A] t 4*}.
This lemma enables us to reduce the problem of axiomatization of PRL(5, S!)
to a purely modal exercise, once an axiomatization of PRL, [A] is known. Surprisingly, logics of the form PRL, [A] , though formulated in a richer language, are usually easier to deal with (especially modally) than their bimodal counterparts.
Kripke semantics
We call the usual tree-like upwards well-founded Kripke models for GL just models. The following two lemmas were obtained in [17, 6, 12] , and in [4] , respectively.
Lemma 2.7. CSM t-4 * (YT It 4 for all (jinite) Carlson-models ?T).
Lemma 2.8. P I-4 G (YF IF 4 for all (jinite) d.c. models Icy-).
For 
Provability logics for finitely axiomatized extensions
Let a theory T be given. An arithmetic sentence A is called injinitely confident in Y iff for each n > 1
9-t A+ Con"(T),
in other words iff the theory T + A is infinitely confident in 9.
Examples:
Con(ZF) is infinitely confident in PA, Con(PRA) is infinitely confident in EA, Con(ZC,) is infinitely confident in IC, for n > m.
In this section we characterize the provability logic with a constant for an arbitrary (but fixed!) infinitely confident and true n,-sentence TC. From this a characterization of bimodal provability logics for infinitely confident finite U,-axiomatized extensions of theories comes out via the canonical translation *. Let ZCP' denote the system given above. It is trivial that for any 5?(0, c)-formula Q,
In order to prove the converse implication first we shall describe a simple Kripke semantics for ZCPc.
Recall that the depth function on a model W is a mapping d of W to the ordinals uniquely determined by the following condition:
where we assume sup 0 = 0. Step 2. We only take this step if MO is empty. Let n be the number of all subformulas of 4 of the form q $. For the (--) ) side first note that
EA I-Vz(z$MuRr\ 3m(h(m)=z)-+~$MuR).
Reasoning inside EA: "Suppose that h(m) = z and z $ M u R. Since M is downward closed and h is already outside M, clearly C! 4 M. To conclude that / 4 R as well notice that h can only get to R via clause (3.2) , that is from one of the nodes in M. However, no such node is accessible from those where h could stay after the moment m."
Now it follows by Lemma 3.7(3) that
EA k Vz(z~MuR~~=z+Pr,~L'>ir\~~MuR~).
Using this fact we obtain by an easy induction on the depth of z that
Hence,
Ttrc+le~MuR,
because rc is infinitely confident in 5. It remains to show that Reasoning in EA: "If rc then clause (3.2) will never be operative and hence h will never have a chance to jump to R". 0 Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 2.6. 
IcP'+ k 4 0 (N kf(g5)for all 7c-interpretationsf).
Remark 3.12. For theories .Y containing ZC1 Theorem 3.1 could easily be uniformized (cf. [l, 17] ), i.e. for a given infinitely confident true n,-sentence 71, a n-interpretation f can be found, such that for all _%'(o, c)-formulas 4, Remark 3.13. Theorem 3.1 could be extended to the language with constants for several n, -sentences n1 , . . . , T-C, provided each q + 1 is infinitely confident in the theory ~ + hi.
Proofs of all these statements are obtained by standard modifications of the given proof of Theorem 3.1 (cf. [17] ). visualizes the fact that the notion of provably reflexive extension is invariant, i.e., that any theory provably equivalent to a provably reflexive one (over a fixed theory Y), is itself provably reflexive over Y. We also immediately obtain the following corollary. Proof. The idea of the proof is just to add all consistency statements Con(F, %!rm) (and iterations of them) to the theory Q as new axioms. To carry through this construction formally first we shall need an auxiliary U,-formula C(x, m) constructed via the arithmetical Fixed Point Theorem such that
Reflexive extensions
EA I-Vx,m(C(x,m)c*x=Ov~Pr~+,r,r~C(f-1,ti)l).
In other words,
EA F Vm C(O,m)
and
EA I-Vx,m(C(x+ l,m)t,Con(~++~m+ rC(x,m)l)). (4.1) (4.2)
Lemma 4.4. The following statements are provable in EA:
(
1) Vx, m, n (m d n A C(x, n) + C(x, m)); (2) Vx,y,m (x d y A C(y, m)+ C(x, m)).
Note that within PA one can obtain (1) and (2) from (4.1) and (4.2) directly by induction.
The induction formulas, however, are too complex for this argument to work within EA. We get round this difficulty by applying the following lemma from [15] .
Lemma 4.5. Suppose an arithmetic formula A(x) is reflexively progressive, i.e.
EA F A(0) A Vx(Pr,,'A(x)J + A(x + l)),
then EA k VxA(x).
Proof. Clearly,
Hence by Lob's Theorem
EA F VxA(x).
q
Proof of Lemma 4.4. (1) We show that the formula A(x) := Vm, n(m < n A C(x, n) -3 C(x, m))
is reflexively progressive. Thus,
~~~mmn~c(~+i,n)~Pr,,rc(1,li)~C(%riz)l~Con(~+~rn+~C(~,ri)~) -+ con(F + @ rm + r C(i, ti)l) +c~n(F+a rm+ rC(a,ti)l) + C(x + 1, m).
Hence, Clearly, 9' extends F and 4. To conclude that % = %' we have only to demonstrate that for all n and kE N,
EA F Vm,n,x(m < n
I-C(& ii).
This easily follows from the reflexivity of '??J over F and from (4.1), (4.2) by metamathematical induction on k. Now using Lemma 4.4 and the fact that provably in EA for all k and n,
we deduce 
EA F Con(F + Wrm)+-Con(F + arm + {C(iT, ii)lk, n < m})
Provability logics for reflexive extensions
Let RP denote the system axiomatized by all the rules and axiom schemes of P together with principle (R). In this section we prove our main theorem. 
PRL(Y, 92) E RP
Before proceeding to the proof of this theorem let us collect a few facts about RP. First of all, it is easy to see that for all nE N, RP t-Aldl, and hence RP 2 ICP. We have already noted that this inclusion is strict. The following lemma gives us a useful principle in RP which can be thought of as a general form of Goryachev's theorem [lo] : PA together with the local reflection principle Rfn(PA) for PA is relatively interpretable in PA,. 
(m). Case 3: h(m)EM' if for some y d m P&(y, 'l-l), then h(m + l):= r(h(m)).
If there is no such proof select one of the following three clauses:
z$ R and Prfr(m,'t # .F'), (4 h(m+ l):= z if z> h(m), zeB and Prji(m,'t #Zl), (vi) h(m) if there is no such z. (vii)
In case (vi) we set g(m + 1): = "the g.n. of the largest @-axiom occurring in the proof with the g.n. m". Otherwise, g(m + l):= g(m). Here /' denotes the limit of h as usual.
We formulate and prove the following Lemmas 5.5-5.11 within EA.
Lemma 5.5. (1) Vm,n(m < n+ h(m)< h(n)),
(2)f=Ove=iv-.. (1) Vz,y(e=~r\z<yAy~R~iPr,~e#~l), 
ve=k.
Lemma5.6. (1) Vm,x(h(m)=x A xeB AT U(g(m))+/#x), (2) Vx(t'= x A XEM'+ Con(%)).
Proof. (1) Suppose that 8 = x E B, h(m) = x and 1 U(g(m)). Then clearly for some n, 1 Uo(n, g(m)
)
Vx,y(xiy~Mr\e=x-,lP~~~~#31).
Proof. Suppose 8 = x < y and y E M. If y E B then clearly h will make a move from x by clause (vi) once a proof of e # jj in %! appears. And this is impossible, for we assume 8 = x. Therefore, suppose that y E M' and !?/ !-e # j?. By Lemma 2.5, On the other hand, by Lemma 5.6(2) and by Cr-completeness 9-k e=y+Con(4).
It follows that
i.e. 
Since for all m, %2 I-U(m), it follows that
42 k-e # r(X).
On the other hand, by Lemma 5. Proof of Theorem 5.1 (conclusion). Since the theory 42 is sound, clauses (iii) and (iv) of the definition of h will never be operative. Hence N k e = 6. On the other hand, by Lemma 10
Iff (4) were provable in F then, clearly, it would follow that 7 F / # b0 and hence h would make a move from b, quod non. Remark 5.18. A perhaps more natural kind of Kripke semantics for RP is described in [4] . However, those models are infinite and Lemma 5.6 is the first step in the completeness proof of [4] anyway.
Between finite and reflexive extensions
In a view of the results of Sections 3 and 5 it seems natural to ask, whether there exists an infinitely confident and provably n,-axiomatized extension (F, 42) which has a strictly intermediate provability logic, i.e.
ICP c PRL(F, ?2) c RP.
We answer this question positively by constructing an irreflexive extension satisfying the following principle:
which apparently is not derivable in ICP. Let F be any theory extending ZC1 (for weaker theories the construction is slightly more complicated). Clearly, ZC, proves that the limit e exists. Hence, despite W being infinite, all the standard properties of Solovay function are provable in ZZ,.
Define for i = 0, 1 Ci:= {Cj,iljE~)) and put 7c:=&ECouCru{O}.
To verify statement (a) of our lemma note that by the construction of w F I-7!EC1-+7r A Pryri7c1.
Hence, if for some n 2 1
It follows that h must leave the bottom node and this is impossible.
To check (b) we reason inside ZC,: "By properties of Solovay function and by the construction of W, for every n 2 1 r t-[EC0 A Con"+'(q+ Con(9-+ n+ CodyF)).
Hence, if for some n
By provable C,-completeness we also have thus LT t-con"+'(_?T)+&$c&.
It follows that for all u E Co such that d(u) > n, Therefore, as there are elements of C,, of arbitrary finite depth, h must eventually quit the bottom node. Since 0 is the only element of W of depth o, the function h leaves 0 if and only if the theory FW is inconsistent, hence the result." 0 Consider now the extension (5, Fm + x), where z is defined as in Lemma 6.1. By part (a) of this lemma, the theory FU + n is not reflexive over F-; hence
as required.
Provability logics for recursive progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency
There are at least two ways to formalize the definition (Tl)-(T3) of transfinite progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency. One relies on a concept of a, say, Kalmar elementary well-ordering (as e.g. in [15] ), and the other one relies on the alternative concept of a system of ordinal notation (as in [9] ). Let me briefly consider the easier approach first.
Progressions along Kalmar elementary well-orderings
A Here YU denotes the theory numerated by AxF(ti; x). For the sake of readability we shall also write Pr,(z; x) for PrZ(x).
Clearly, such enumeration formulas can be constructed via the arithmetical Evidently, EA proves that <o linearly orders the set Q (and therefore, the set D). Hence (D, cQ) is the desired interpretation.
Remark 7.4. Note that specific well-order properties of (D, <) are inessential for the proof of Theorem 7.1, and we only need the least number principle for, say, arithmetical subsets of D to show that all theories in progressions based on iteration of consistency along D are sound. Therefore, Theorem 7.1 holds for Kalmar elementary reasonable quasi-well-orderings as well.
Progressions for systems of ordinal notation
For simplicity, in this section we shall assume all theories to contain Peano Our goal is to give an example of a system of ordinal notation 9, s.t.
(1) %" gives exactly one notation to each constructive ordinal; (2) for every %"-progression ( z))rsz based on iteration of consistency, if a, bEZ, 1 a ) < ) b ) and ) b ) is a limit ordinal, then the theory s is provably reflexive over z.
The main technical problem in constructing such a system is the absence, in general, of the provable monotonicity property for progressions satisfying (Fl)-(F3). In order to overcome the analogous difficulty in the theory of hierarchies of recursive functions, Schmidt [16] introduced the concept of the built-up system of ordinal notation. Here we will construct such a system, which is provably and primitively recursively built-up and gives notations uniformly to all constructive ordinals (cf. also [14, pp. 48-551 We also assume that obvious properties of these operations are provable in PA. Further, fix a universal pr. function for all Kalmar elementary ones, as e.g. in [14] . The expression {e} (x) will denote the value of the Kalmar elementary function with index e on argument x, if e is an index, and 0 otherwise. We assume that 0 is not an index of any function.
The system of ordinal notation 0 ' is given by the following clauses:
(1) oEo+ and lOI= 0; Proof. By induction on 1 a I. For a = 0 and ) a 1 a successor the statement is obvious.
Suppose now that 1 a 1 is a limit ordinal and consider any two elements ci, c2 < +a. We have to show that either cl d +cz or c2 d +cl. This is clear in case that one of cr, c2 equals a. If both ci, c2 # a then for some n,, n, EN c1 6 +a[nI] and c2 d +a[nz]. Now observe that by Lemma 7.7 the fundamental sequences for all the notations from O+ are monotone in the sense of < +. Hence for n = max(ni, nz) both c1 and c2 are < +a[n] and the induction hypothesis yields the statement of our lemma. q
Now we are going to define a special ordinal exponentiation function within the system of notation 8+. Let for any z and x t(z,x) denote the natural index of the Kalmar elementary function f(n) given by the following scheme:
f(n + 1) = {z3 (xCn1). (One should take n = max(k, m), k and m given by (7.5) and (7.6), respectively). By (7.4) Arbitrary progressions satisfying (Fl)-(F3) need not, in general, satisfy the provable II,-axiomatizability property, which is also substantial for the good behavior of provability logics (cf. [S] ). However, an easy fixed point argument shows the following lemma. Section 1 of an earlier version of this paper. Special thanks are due to Volodya Shavrukov for numerous valuable suggestions and remarks.
